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CORRECTION 
On page 9 of Appellants’ opening brief, a statement is made that Rosalie began 
contributing funds to Construct Tech to pay legal fees ―[b]eginning on February 2, 2004, 
less than two months after Ed’s death.‖  In fact, those payments began in 1994.  Ed died 
December 17, 2003, a fact which was intended to have been inserted in the following pa-
ragraph as a preface to a discussion of partnership dissolution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ROSALIE’S NOTICE OF APPEAL GIVES THIS COURT JURISDIC-
TION TO DECIDE ALL OF THE MATTERS RAISED BY APPEL-
LANTS ON THIS APPEAL. 
A. Rosalie’s Notice Perfected an Appeal in Her Individual Ca-
pacity. 
The recitation of ―Trustee of the Hendrickson Family Trust‖ following Rosalie’s 
name in her Notice is presumed under Utah law to be mere descriptio personae without 
any legal effect.  Accordingly, the Notice must be construed as having perfected Rosa-
lie’s appeal in her personal capacity, unless the presumption is rebutted by restrictive lan-
guage relating to the title or extrinsic evidence that clearly and unambiguously shows that 
Rosalie was named in the Notice only in her fiduciary capacity of trustee. 
The application of descriptio personae to a notice of appeal is a question of first 
impression in Utah.  In applying the doctrine to other legal documents, however, the Utah 
courts have developed a straightforward test that governs such application:  (1) fiduciary 
or representative titles following a person’s name or signature in a legal document are 
presumed to be merely descriptive and without legal effect; unless (2) there is either 
(a) language accompanying the title which unambiguously specifies that the party was 
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acting solely in a fiduciary or representative rather than a personal capacity; or 
(b) evidence extrinsic to the signature and title which unambiguously shows that the party 
was acting in a fiduciary or representative rather than a personal capacity.  TWN, Inc. v. 
Michel (“TWN II”), 2006 UT App 70, ¶ 24, 131 P.3d 882; Forest Meadow Ranch Prop-
erty Owners Ass’n v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass’n, 2005 UT App 294, ¶¶ 27-28, 118 
P.3d 871; TWN, Inc. v. Michel (“TWN I”), 2003 UT App 70, ¶ 14, 66 P.3d 1031.1 
Rosalie’s title is not preceded by ―as,‖ ―in my capacity as,‖ or other such limiting 
words or phrases that would rebut the presumption.  To the contrary, Rosalie’s title ap-
pears without any introductory restriction whatsoever, as a mere appositive or synonym 
for Rosalie herself.  Under Utah law, therefore, the language of the Notice does not rebut 
the presumption that its recitation of Rosalie’s title is mere descriptio personae. 
B. Dennis’s and Rosalie’s  Notices Together Pefected an Appeal 
by Construction Industrial. 
Neither the Utah Partnership Act, nor the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (the 
―UPA‖) on which the Utah Act is based, expressly addresses how claims held by a gener-
                                              
1
 See also R. Collin Mangrum & Dee Benson, MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE 
115 (2009) (summarizing the Utah descriptio personae doctrine). 
 
Where a contract or deed exists binding an individual, but the individual inexplic-
ably signs as an agent, trustee, or as an officer, then the added or qualified refer-
ence is presumptively descriptio personae or mere surplusage and the obligation 
or grant is extended to the individual personally unless the named person can rebut 
the presumption.  To rebut this presumption, the person should either add addi-
tional language in the contract or deed indicating that he is only signing in a repre-
sentative capacity or resort to extrinsic evidence to show that he indeed signed in a 
representative capacity. 
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al partnership are to be pleaded.
2
  Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 
1988).  At common law, however, it was mandatory that partnership claims be pleaded in 
the individual names of all of the partners rather than in the name of the partnership.  
William A. Gregory, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 207, at 336 (3rd ed. 
2001) (―The basic common law rule is that partnerships must sue in the names of all of 
the partners, and that a suit against a partnership must name all of the partners.‖); e.g., 
Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Utah 1984); Wall Investment Co. v. Garden Gate 
Distrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979). 
This mandatory joinder rule has been criticized in Utah and other jurisdictions as 
harsh and inflexible.  See Wall Investment, 593 P.2d at 544 (quoting or citing Loucks v. 
Albuquerque Nat’l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); ELEVENTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF NEW YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1945)).  Accordingly, the mandatory character 
of the joinder rule has been relaxed in most jurisdictions, including Utah, to additionally 
permit suit in the partnership’s name alone.  See Cottonwood Mall, 767 P.2d at 501 (hold-
ing that general partnership may sue in its own name) (adopting analysis of Gary Energy 
Corp. v. Metro Oil Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69, 70-71 (D. Utah 1987) (predicting how Utah 
courts would rule on this question)); Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 714 
P.2d 155, 157 (Mont. 1986)). 
                                              
2
 The Utah Partnership Act is a nearly verbatim enactment of the UPA.  See UTAH PART-
NERSHIP ACT, UTAH CODE ANN, § 48-1-1 & pp. 135-37 (2004) (listing Utah among states 
that have adopted the UPA); id. at 35 (Supp. 2009) (same). 
 
 -4- 
There is nothing in the Utah decisions relaxing the common law joinder rule, how-
ever, to suggest that it is anything other than permissive.  Utah common law permits a 
partnership to sue in its own name, but does not require it; it displaces the former com-
mon law requirement that a partnership sue only in the individual names of all of its part-
ners, but continues to allow a partnership to sue in the individual names of all of its part-
ners, if it wishes.  See Cottonwood Mall, 767 P.2d at 500 (observing that the Utah Part-
nership Act and the UPA ―are silent on whether a partnership may sue in its own name‖) 
(emphasis added); Kemp, 680 P.2d at 760 (concluding that to properly bring a partnership 
claim, the plaintiff-partner ―was required either to name the partnership as the real party 
in interest or to join his co-partner as a necessary party‖) (emphasis added); cf. Gary 
Energy, 114 F.R.D. at 70 (holding that partnership may sue in it own name because the 
failure of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to expressly authorize it ―is not indicative of 
an intent to prohibit such a suit‖). 
Utah common law thus incorporates the universally accepted proposition that a 
partnership claim may be pursued in the individual names of all of its partners, even in 
those jurisdictions that permit suit by a partnership in its name alone.  See II Alan R. 
Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 5.02(b), at 
5:11 (2010) (―All partners together can enforce a partnership right in virtually every U.S. 
jurisdiction.  This follows from their management rights, which can be exercised un-
animously even in extraordinary matters‖) (emphasis in original) (citing and discussing 
UPA); Alan R. Bromberg, Enforcement of Partnership Rights—Who Sues for the Part-
nership?, 70 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991) (―An action by all of the partners in their own 
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names . . . is permitted in almost all states and required in a few.‖); id. at 5-6 
(―[E]nforcement of partnership rights by all the partners together, which was the common 
law practice . . . is sufficient almost everywhere and necessary in a relatively small num-
ber of states.  []  All partners together can enforce a partnership right in virtually every ju-
risdiction in the United States.‖). 
The Utah cases cited by Tammy for the proposition that partnerships  may sue on-
ly in their own names are inapposite because her cases apply only to limited partnerships.  
Utah law draws a sharp distinction between limited partnerships, which are purely crea-
tures of statute akin to corporations, and general partnerships, which are governed by 
common law except where displaced by statute.  In Wall Investment, for example, the 
court found it unnecessary to decide ―whether a general partnership can sue in its own 
name‖ because the 
plaintiff here is a limited partnership, not a general one.  Limited partnerships 
were unknown to the common law and are, like corporations, creatures of statute.  
The quasi-corporate aspects of a limited partnership and the quasi-shareholder sta-
tus of a limited partner are obvious.  The same reasoning and policy considerations 
which justify recognition of corporations as proper parties plaintiff apply as well 
to limited partners.  Moreover, there is specific legislative recognition that a li-
mited partnership, as an entity distinct from its partners, can bring suit. 
 
593 P.2d at 544 (footnotes omitted). 
 Assuming that Construction Industrial was a legally formed and validly existing 
partnership under the Utah Partnership Act, as Appellants argue, Construction Industrial 
was dissolved upon Ed’s death, but continued to exist as a partnership among Rosalie and 
Dennis pending the winding up of its affairs.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-27 (―On dis-
solution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership 
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affairs is completed.‖); id., § 48-1-28(4) (―Dissolution is caused . . . [b]y the death of any 
partner.‖); e.g., Hurley v. Hurley, 91 A.2d 674, 675 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1952) (holding that 
partnership dissolved by death of partner continued as partnership among surviving part-
ners during winding up process); cf. Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (―Upon dissolution, the surviving partner, in the absence of an agreement 
stating otherwise, has the duty to wind up the partnership‖). 
Accordingly, Dennis’s and Rosalie’s respective notices of appeal filed in their per-
sonal capacities perfected an appeal on behalf of Construction Industrial because they 
comprised all of the partners of Construction Industrial at the time that the notices were 
filed. 
C. Dennis and Rosalie Have Standing to Challenge the District 
Court’s Imposition of Alter-Ego and Veil-Piercing Remedies 
on Construct Tech. 
The effect of piercing the corporate veil because the owner of a corporation has 
treated the corporation as his or her alter ego is to deprive the owner of the benefits of the 
corporate form, notably limited liability.  By making the owners personally liable for 
corporate debts and obligations, and by exposing corporate assets to liability for the per-
sonal debts and obligations of any owner, piercing or reverse-piercing of the corporate 
veil imposes a harm on the owners that is different in kind from the harm that this remedy 
imposes on the corporation. 
Ownership interests do not vanish into thin air.  Either Rosalie is an owner of Con-
struct Tech as Appellants argue, or Dennis is the owner as the District Court found.  It is 
elemental that the shareholders of a corporation have standing to bring suit in their indi-
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vidual capacities when they suffer harm from corporate wrongdoing that is different in 
kind from the harm such wrongdoing inflicts on the corporation.  Aurora Credit Services, 
Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998).  Accordingly, 
either Rosalie or Dennis may bring an action challenging the District Court’s conclusion 
to pierce Construct Tech’s corporate veil on the ground that it is Dennis’s alter ego. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 
FAILING TO EXPLAIN WHY IT IMPOSED A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST ON THE PROPERTY. 
A primary responsibility of the trial court is to articulate a consistent legal justifi-
cation, based on the facts that it finds, for the result that it reaches in a case.  The District 
Court failed to meet this responsibility in this case.  Specifically, its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law failed to offer any legal explanation for its imposition of a construc-
tive trust on title to the Property. 
After concluding that the record owner of the Property, Construction Industrial, 
was Dennis’s alter ego and that neither Ed, Rosalie, nor the Trust had any ownership in-
terest in Construction Industrial, the Court stated:  ―Based on the foregoing, the Court 
concludes that Tammy has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Court 
should disregard how record title to the Riverbend property is presently held (that is, in 
the name of Construction Industrial), and should instead impress a constructive trust upon 
the property for Tammy’s benefit.‖  (Findings & Conclusions, R. 1029 ¶ 103.) 
This is a complete non sequitur.  The Court’s conclusion that Tammy is entitled to 
an equitable lien on the Property as a co-beneficiary of a constructive trust simply does 
not follow from the finding that Construction Industrial is Dennis’s alter ego.  As set 
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forth in Appellants’ opening brief, the requirements for a constructive trust are a wrong-
ful act suffered by the claimant leading to a resulting unjust enrichment of the record title 
holder.  Dennis’s failure to observe the separate existence of Construction Industrial, if it 
was a wrong at all, was a wrong suffered by Rosalie, not Tammy.  Accordingly, it pro-
vides no basis for imposition of a constructive trust in Tammy’s favor. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
IMPOSING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST BECAUSE TAMMY 
KNEW SHE HAD NO CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP WHEN SHE 
WORKED TO IMPROVE IT.  
A. Constructive Trust Is Not a Permissible Remedy for Uncom-
pensated Investment in or Labor Performed on Real Estate by 
One with Actual Knowledge That the Property Is Legally 
Owned by Another. 
The District Court did not explain why it imposed a constructive trust on the Prop-
erty.  Tammy has argued that the trust was justified to protect Tammy’s unrecognized fi-
nancial investment in the Property represented by the $15,900 commission that she 
waived, and her uncompensated contributions to its improvement and operation as a 
business.  Brief of Appellee, at 42.  Utah law is clear, however, that a plaintiff’s enrich-
ment of a property owner by his or her investment or labor is not by itself sufficient to 
justify imposition of a constructive trust on the property; the enrichment must addition-
ally be proven to have been unjust, as when a person works without compensation to im-
prove property whose legal owner has encouraged the belief that the person has a share of 
the ownership interest.  Brief of Appellants, at 41-42. 
Accordingly, appellants have argued that Tammy could not have reasonably be-
lieved that she had a claim of ownership to the Property, because at the time that she 
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worked on it she possessed (i) actual knowledge that the Property was titled in the names 
of businesses to which she had no claim of ownership, and (ii) actual knowledge that 
whoever owned the Property, it was not her.  Brief of Appellants, at 42-43.  In response, 
Tammy argues that she was misled by Dennis into thinking that in 1998 the Property was 
deeded by Construct Tech to Dennis, and that she subsequently worked on the Property 
in the reasonable but mistaken belief that it belonged to her husband rather than one of 
her husband’s companies.3  Brief of Appellee, at 42-43.  The record does not support this 
argument. 
B. Tammy’s Contradictory Testimony That She Thought Dennis 
Was the Owner of the Property Was Not Believable. 
Tammy accuses Appellants of failing to ―marshal as evidence her testimony that 
Dennis . . . told her in 1998 that the quit claim deed to the property which she prepared 
would be used to transfer record title from Construct Tech to himself.‖  Brief of Appel-
lee, at 42.  This testimony, however, is inconsequential because ultimately Tammy testi-
fied to facts putting her, at minimum, on inquiry notice that the deed had not been pre-
pared as she allegedly expected. 
At her deposition, Tammy testified under oath that she prepared the quitclaim 
deeds because ―Dennis said that it would be advantageous for us to quickclaim [sic] the 
property from Construct Tech Corporation to Construction Industrial.‖  (See R. 994, p. 
                                              
3
 It is undisputed that when Tammy prepared the quitclaim deeds to transfer title from 
Construct Tech to Construction Industrial, she left the grantee block blank, and it was 
Dennis who later wrote in ―Construction Industrial‖ as the grantee before filing them. 
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302 (quoting Dep. of Tamara Rae Goggin, Nov. 7, 2007), p. 67.)  When asked by her 
counsel what caused her to change her testimony, Tammy stated that: 
I – I realized – there has been – because there has been so many companies 
and bank accounts that I remembered specifically when Dennis and I sat at 
the kitchen table in the Draper home and how he specifically told me he 
was going to put it in Dennis Goggin.  And then when it came to writing the 
grantee in, he said, “Just leave it blank.‖  (R. 994, p. 313 (emphasis add-
ed).) 
The record shows, therefore, that at the time of her deposition Tamara remem-
bered Dennis unambiguously explaining to her that he was going to deed the Property to 
Construction Industrial, while less than a year later she was able to call forth a vivid re-
collection of Dennis explaining something entirely different that was much more helpful 
to her case at trial.  Either way, she was on notice to inquire in order to protect her al-
leged interest.  The record is otherwise devoid of any evidence that Tammy was unaware 
or otherwise mistaken about who owned the Property when she worked on it. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
FINDING AN EXPRESS ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
DENNIS AND TAMMY. 
A. There Was Insufficient Evidence of a Meeting of the Minds. 
Appellants argued that, even after marshaling all the evidence, the record did not 
support of District Court’s conclusion that Dennis and Tammy entered into an express 
oral agreement to acquire and improve the Property together.  Brief of Appellants, at 33-
38.  Appellants specifically pointed to Tammy’s general lack of credibility, documentary 
and other objective evidence that contradicted Tammy’s testimony about her financial 
contributions to acquiring and improving the Property, Tammy’s actual knowledge that 
 -11- 
the Property was acquired with Dennis’s separate premarital funds and titled in the names 
of businesses in which she had no claim of ownership, and Tammy’s documented con-
cerns about the fact that her name did not appear on the title, including the retention of an 
attorney to force a retitling of the Property.  Brief of Appellants, at 36-38.  Tammy re-
sponded that her lack of credibility was confined to a piece of real property not at issue 
on this appeal, that there is no evidence that she did not fulfill her financial obligations 
under the purported contract, that she waived her real estate commission when Construct 
Tech acquired the Property, that she deeded her home to Construction Industrial, and that 
she and Dennis both spent money out of the Construction Builders account for their own 
personal expenses. 
1. Lack of Evidence Negating an Oral Contract Is Not 
Evidence of the Contract’s Existence. 
The District Court observed in passing that Tammy waived commissions totaling 
$107,444 on real estate transactions unrelated to the Property that she undertook with 
Dennis.  (Findings and Conclusions, R. 1009 n.14.)  Although it is undisputed that there 
is literally no documentary evidence that any of those funds went to the purchase or im-
provement of the Property, Tammy argues that that those monies should be assumed to 
have been contributed to the Property because ―there was no evidence that they were not 
so used.‖  Brief of Appellee, at 46.  This, of course, contradicts the Court’s express find-
ing that the Property was acquired with Dennis’s premarital funds, and that Tammy un-
derstood and agreed to this before the transaction closed.  (Findings & Conclusions, 
R. 996 ¶¶ 29, 104.) 
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A party cannot establish an express oral contract by an appeal to silence, especial-
ly in the face of contrary findings by the court.  Although it should go without saying, si-
lence cannot count as evidence of contractual expression.  The only reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the lack of documentary evidence on this question is that those 
other waived commissions were not used to acquire or to improve the Property. 
2. Neither the Draper Home nor the Proceeds From Its 
Sale Went to Acquire or Improve the Property. 
Tammy argues that her quitclaim of the Draper home to Construction Builders 
constituted performance of her financial obligations under the purported oral agreement.  
Brief of Appellee, at 46, 47.  This reflects a regrettable lack of candor on her part.  As 
appellants documented in detail, Brief of Appellants, at 16-18, the record irrefutably 
shows that Tammy deeded the home to Construction Builders because Dennis had used 
his separate funds in that account to pay off her mortgage, and that when the home was 
finally sold—long after the completion of all improvements to the Property—Dennis and 
Tammy both took care to ensure that the funds remained under Tammy’s control and 
were segregated as her separate premarital property. 
In short, there is no basis for Tammy’s contention that she used her Draper home 
or any proceeds from its sale to acquire or improve the Property in satisfaction of her ob-
ligations to do so under the purported oral agreement. 
3. Dennis Generally Denied the Existence of the Pur-
ported Oral Agreement. 
Tammy argues that Dennis offered no evidence of the terms of the oral agreement, 
concluding from this that Tammy’s self-serving testimony was ―uncontradicted‖ and thus 
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definitively established the terms.  Brief of Appellees, at 46.  Obviously, Dennis did not 
offer testimony on the terms of the purported oral agreement because there was no such 
agreement. 
B. The Purported Agreement Was Too Vague to Be Enforceable 
as a Contract. 
Given the District Court’s finding that the oral agreement was ―express,‖ one 
would expect to find quotations by either the District Court or Tammy to specific ―ex-
pressions‖ of contractual terms to which the parties mutually assented.  Yet, the only con-
tent that the District Court was able to give to the purportedly ―express‖ contract was the 
legalistic ―Tammy and Dennis reached an express oral agreement to purchase, hold, and 
develop the property, and the equestrian business therein, for their mutual enjoyment and 
benefit‖—words that one can hardly imagine Tammy and Dennis to have said to each 
other.  Moreover, even this formulation is too vague to enforce as a contract.  Even as-
suming that Tammy and Dennis agreed to acquire and improve the Property ―together,‖ 
the record does not disclose such crucially material terms as what they each agree to con-
tribute in the way of money and labor, how they would be compensated for those contri-
butions, or who would actually own the Property.  Accordingly, there is simply no basis 
on which the District Court could have made a judgment that Dennis breached this pur-
ported contract, or that Tammy did not. 
Appellants rested their argument on this point on Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. 
Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179, which is squarely on point. Brief of Appellants, at 39-
40.  Although the purported contract in Prince, Yeates had many more documented terms 
 -14- 
than the purported oral agreement here, the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce it, 
reasoning that there was simply no evidence of what would have constituted perfor-
mance.  Id., ¶¶ 13-14, 94 P.3d at 183. 
Tammy chose not to discuss Prince, Yeates despite its obvious relevance here.  
Appellants submit that Tammy’s vague references to joint acquisition and development 
of the Property simply do not pass the test established in that case. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RIVER-
BEND PROPERTY IS PART OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
Tammy expends little effort attempting to defend the trial court’s decision to in-
clude the Riverbend Property in the marital estate.  In fact, her only defense of it is the 
conclusory statement that ―[t]he issue was pled and consequently the court was entitled 
from the evidence to find that the Riverbend Property constituted marital property.‖  
(Brief, p. 48.) 
In fact, the issue was not framed by the pleadings.  The claims for relief in the 
Amended Complaint were constructive trust, declaratory judgment that Dennis held title 
alone or in constructive trust, quiet title in Dennis Goggin, breach of contract, and specif-
ic performance.  (R. 276-79.)  The record citation references upon which Tammy relies 
are not in the claims for relief, but rather are simple statements in the factual allegations 
of the Amended omplaint.  The only one which described the property as marital property 
says: 
The Riverbend Ranch was acquired during The Marriage and the-
reafter was jointly occupied, used and maintained by Plaintiff and Dennis 
Goggin during The Marriage as their marital property and was so acquired, 
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maintained and used with their joint and mutual contribution of money, 
work and services.  (R. 268, ¶ 24.)
4
 
This statement is not linked to any claim for relief, and is not a necessary factual predi-
cate for any claim for relief asserted in the Amended Complaint.  The Amended Com-
plaint also contains a detailed prayer for relief, which again makes no mention that a dec-
laration that the Riverbend Property is marital is part of the requested relief.  (R. 280-81.) 
At trial, when Tammy attempted to introduce evidence of her contribution of time 
and effort to development of the property, the question of the purpose of the evidence 
specifically came up.  In response to an objection as to its purpose, Tammy’s counsel ex-
plained that it was relevant to the constructive trust claim, and the trial court adopted that 
position: 
MR, PARKER:  Your Honor, I’m going to object to this line of 
questioning on the grounds of relevance.  The—her involvement in improv-
ing the property or putting up the fence or any of these kinds of things are 
. . . not relevant to the question of ownership as it’s framed in the pleadings. 
. . . 
MR, WESTON:  Your Honor, obviously, it is relevant.  It has to do, 
beginning first of all, with why she was there, what she and Dennis were 
doing together, her participation.  The primary thrust of this lawsuit is the 
imposition of constructive trust.  We cited this case, the Zions Bank/Park 
case, which is similar, which then the husband was attempting there to es-
tablish what he had done with regard to the acquisition property.  We’re 
now here talking about what Tammy Larsen was doing with regard to the 
improvement, the development, the planning of the property.  All of which 
represented her contribution, which the Court must, of course, take into ac-
                                              
4
 Tammy also refers to ¶ 27 of the Amended Complaint, which mentions ―construction of 
the marital home;‖ and ¶ 30, which avers that she and Dennis occupied and used River-
bend Ranch ―as their marital property.‖  Viewed in the context of the specific claims for 
relief alleged in the Amended Complaint, neither of those reference is sufficient to place 
Dennis on notice that the issue of transmutation of separate property is to be decided in 
this case, rather than the divorce case. 
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count in determining whether there was a constructive trust and whether 
she had any involvement in that.  And therefore, has a protected interest. 
MR PARKER:  . . . .  [T]his may be very relevant testimony in the 
divorce case if she’s trying to establish exceptional circumstances with re-
gard to separate property with Dennis, but I don’t think it’s relevant here 
where the question is—is the—the relationship between Dennis and the 
Hendrickson Trust. 
THE COURT:  I disagree.  I think it is relevant to the extent that, as 
I read their pleadings, there is presumably some kind of arrangement or 
conspiracy or at a minimum the use of—I guess they don't use the word 
―conspiracy,‖ but the use of, by Mr. Goggin, of other entities to shield as-
sets essentially from—from Tammy.  I think that there is relevance.  And 
I—to the extent that the trust is or was—or wasn’t aware of the contribu-
tions, I still think it is relevant to what claims there may be for what bene-
fits Mr. Goggin may have received and—and—and who would be, in fact, 
unjustly enriched on this matter.  (R. 993, pp. 126-29.) 
After trial, the court requested that the parties submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the court for consideration.  Tellingly, Tammy’s proposed findings 
and conclusions make no mention of marital property and no request that the court delve 
into the divorce issues by holding the Riverbend Property to be marital property.  
(R. 924-60.)  To the contrary, the proposed findings note that the ―determination and al-
location of the marital property‖ was reserved for decision by the judge in the divorce 
case.  (R. 926, ¶ 6.) 
Although issues not expressly raised in the pleadings may be tried by consent, ―[a] 
trial court may not base its decision on an issue that was tried inadvertently.‖  Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).  To do otherwise is a violation of due 
process.  In re Adoption of S.L.F., 2001 UT App 183, ¶ 10, 27 P.3d 583. 
Parties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice that a particular 
issue is being considered by a court and must be given an opportunity to 
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present evidence and argument on that issue before decision.  To be suffi-
cient, the notice must advise the parties of the specific issues which they 
must prepare to meet.  Thus, the party must be given a reasonable opportu-
nity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. 
W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted). 
It is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and 
unsupported by the record.  The trial court is not privileged to determine 
matters outside the issues of the case, and if he does, his findings will have 
no force or effect.  In law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the 
issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to render a 
decision on issues not presented for determination.  Any findings rendered 
outside the issues are a nullity.  A court may not grant judgment for relief 
which is neither requested by the pleadings nor within the theory on which 
the case was tried, whether that theory was expressly stated or implied by 
the proof adduced.  Parties may limit the scope of the litigation if they 
choose, and if an issue is clearly withheld, the court cannot nevertheless ad-
judicate it and grant corresponding relief.  The limitation to try the issues 
presented obtains whether the action is one in law or in equity and includes 
declaratory judgments as well. 
Combe v. Warren’s Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P. 2d 733, 739 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
In the present case, even if this Court upholds all of the predicate findings that the 
Riverbend Property is presently owned by Dennis, it remains undisputed that the funds 
used to acquire it were premarital.  The issue of transmutation of separate property into 
marital property requires a careful balancing of factors in an effort to determine whether 
commingling has occurred or exceptional circumstances exist.  Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 
1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted).  Accord, Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).  Even if the issue had been properly before the court, it did 
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not engage in the proper analysis of the issue and its gratuitous resolution of the issue 
cannot withstand scrutiny. 
Tammy can point to nothing in the record which may fairly be said to place Den-
nis on notice that the question of whether the Riverbend Ranch should be included in the 
marital estate would be tried in this case.  Indeed, all indications were to the contrary, the 
court ruled to the contrary in response to an objection, and such relief was never re-
quested by any party, including Tammy.  The District Court court did it sua sponte.  Its 
judgment on this point ―does not respond to any of the issues presented for determina-
tion,‖ Combe, 680 P.2d at 736, and therefore must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellants request that this Court reverse the judgment 
of the District Court as to the Riverbend Property and remand the case with instructions 
to enter judgment in favor of the Hendrickson defendants on their counterclaims. 
DATED this ____ day of April, 2010. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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